tary choices of owners are related to various factors. This analysis examines laws
each owner may be subject to and considers this information in the model. Wisconsin
is also not an outlier because it does not ban smoking everywhere, as does California,
nor does it fail to control its use in restaurants, as does Nevada. Finally, the adult
smoking rate in Wisconsin is 23.4 percent, which is well within two standard devia
tions from the median smoking rate of 22.9 percent of all states. [Cook, 1999]
The paper begins with a literature review summarizing previous studies that
address smoking policies. This is followed by a description of the data. An economic
model then indicates which factors underlie smoking policies chosen by owners, and
determines which factors are important to smoking policies in the absence of govern
ment restrictions and which factors are no longer important following the imposition
of smoking laws. The conclusion discusses implications about the private market in
accommodation and the effects of smoking bans and restrictions on individual owners.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Only limited research has been conducted on the private market in accommoda
tion. Two studies directly examine seating allocations within restaurants and bars.
Boyes and Marlow [1996] examine survey data in San Luis Obispo, one of the first
cities to institute a ban on smoking in restaurants and bars. Sixty-four restaurants
and bars were surveyed-roughly 65 percent of all affected businesses. The authors
suggest that an active market in private accommodation existed prior to the ban
because 62 percent of owners had non-smoking sections.
Logit models of support for bans in San Luis Obispo were estimated using data
from a random survey of764 individuals, 84 percent of whom were non-smokers. The
empirical evidence indicates that the odds of supporting the smoking ban are signifi
cantly lower for respondents who smoke and are male. Age, education, and whether
or not a respondent resided in the local community did not significantly influence
odds of supporting the ban. Despite widespread support for the bans a significant
percentage of the non-smokers (62 percent) also believed that smoking/non-smoking
sections dealt effectively with smoking prior to the ban. Apparently, while a majority
of non-smokers believed that the private market in accommodation was effective,
they nonetheless favored outright bans.
Dunham and Marlow [2000a] also study private market accommodation. They
examine national survey data drawn in 1996 from owners/managers of 1,300 ran
domly selected restaurants (650) and bars/taverns (650) across the United States.
Samples were drawn in a statistically random manner and were applicable to all
such establishments with a maximum sampling error of approximately plus or mi
nus 4 percentage points. The survey found that, for restaurants, on average, 54
percent of seating was allocated to non-smoking, and for bars/taverns 5 percent was
thus allocated. Both restaurants and bars/taverns exhibited cases where smoking
was entirely prohibited as well as allowed throughout establishments. The authors
conclude that state smoking laws do not influence allocations of non-smoking seat
ing and suggest that laws are passed in states with relatively few smokers and there
fore owners had already allocated relatively many seats to non-smoking use prior to

the passage of laws. This hypothesis is supported by their finding that states with
relatively many people involved in the tobacco manufacturing industry are signifi
cantly less likely to pass smoking laws than those states with relatively few workers.
They also find that the percentage of seating allocated to non-smoking is negatively
related to the percentage of smokers in the population, is significantly higher for
owners affiliated with chains, and is significantly lower for older businesses and for
bars.
A limited number of studies build on the information gained from surveys of
business owners and patrons and attempt to determine the microeconomic effects of
smoking bans. While the detailed analysis of enterprise survey data discussed above
finds that smoking bans have differential effects, these studies utilize a factor analy
sis approach to determine how the bans actually impact business. Dunham and
Winegarden [1999] examine the data from the 1996 survey of restaurant owners dis
cussed above and find that customers patronize hospitality establishments to placate
the desire to fill three distinct needs: food, social companionship, and status. Smok
ing bans appear to positively impact restaurants that supply the first need, while
harming those that supply the other two. The actual impact of the smoking ban on a
particular restaurant will depend on how that establishment meets the three needs.
The authors conclude that this is why fast-food type establishments have all re
stricted smoking, and in part why the aggregate research discussed below shows
that bans have little or no impact.
Indirect evidence on the private market for accommodation may be suggested by
examining the much larger literature that addresses whether or not smoking bans
lower revenues (as a proxy for profits) of owners of restaurants and bars. This litera
ture follows one oftwo directions. One direction focuses on the impacts on individual
owners. Dunham and Marlow [2000b] examine the distribution of expected effects of
smoking laws on revenues using the previously discussed data from a nationwide
survey of 1,300 restaurants and bars. For restaurants, 6 percent of owners predicted
that bans would raise revenues, 39 percent predicted lower revenues, and 55 percent
predicted no changes. For bars and taverns, a ban was predicted to raise revenues by
2 percent of owners, lower revenues by 83 percent, and produce no change in rev
enues by 13 percent. Predictions of gains, losses, and no effects on revenues are
found to be consistent with how owners allocate seating within their establishments.
That is, the lower the amount of seating allocated to non-smoking use, the higher
the probability that an owner predicted that a smoking ban would lower revenues.
This result indicates that seating allocations are made on the basis of profits, as is
consistent with an efIicient private accommodation market. They also conclude that
bar owners are more than twice as likely to predict revenue reductions than are
owners of restaurants.
The other research direction aggregates all owners into one "community-wide"
impact. A number of studies have concluded that businesses do not suffer reduced
sales as a result of bans. Glantz and Smith compare 15 cities with smoking laws with
15 matched control group cities. They conclude: "[L]egislators and government offi
cials can enact such health and safety requirements to protect patrons and employees
in restaurants from the toxins in second-hand tobacco smoke without the fear of ad

verse economic consequences" [1994, 1085]. In their study of smoking laws in North
Carolina, Goldstein and Sobel conclude: "Even in the number one tobacco-producing
state in the U.s., ETS regulations present no adverse economic impact, and there is
no need for exceptions to the ordinances based on such fears" [1998, 288]. Sciacca
and Ratliff conclude in their study of Arizona firms: "This study seems to indicate
that prohibiting smoking in all Flagstaff restaurants has had no effect on total res
taurant sales ... If these findings are true for communities throughout the United
States, then other cities can enact similar laws, which protect patrons and food ser
vice workers from tobacco smoke, without concerns that restaurants will lose busi
ness" [1998, 184].
In addition to the research discussed above, a number of public opinion surveys
[Penn and Schoen, 1996; Biener and Siegel, 1997; Sciacca, 1996] have been conducted
to gauge the general public's response to questions related to smoke-free restaurants.
These surveys ask whether or not people would prefer to have smoking sections avail
able in establishments, and who they think should regulate smoking. These survey
based studies do not provide any economic information, nor do they control for whether
or not respondents actually frequent the establishments about which they are opin
ing. Generally speaking, surveys conducted by anti-tobacco groups find that the pub
lic prefers that smoking be banned in restaurants. Verifying these responses is diffi
cult because the survey instruments are rarely released. Surveys conducted by busi
ness groups/governments find that generally people prefer some form of accommoda
tion and suggest that it is up to owners to establish policies.
Even ifthe "community-wide" approach is considered appropriate for examining
the effects of smoking bans on owner revenues, it is not particularly useful when
examining the private market for accommodation because the approach cannot sepa
rate out those owners who allocate more seating space to non-smoking use prior to
bans. 2 Moreover, there is no way to know what percentage of owners experience
gains or losses, because all data are aggregated into one community-wide number.
That is, there is no information about individual owners. An understanding of differ
ential effects is essential for a comprehensive social welfare analysis and would be
necessary when determining appropriate levels of compensation for injured parties
within the broader framework of social welfare analysis. 3

ECONOMIC MODEL OF HOW BUSINESS OWNERS HANDLE SMOKING
ISSUES
Problems inherent in government attempts to fully internalize externalities are
well known. Turvey [1963] argues that corrective taxation must deal with the follow
ing two problems before it undertakes corrective action. One: government must ascer
tain and then enforce policies whose benefits outweigh costs. That is, corrective poli
cies require knowledge oftrue levels of externality and then political and administra
tive processes must set policies in line with that knowledge. Two: corrective action
should be pursued only as long as it doesn't unfavorably affect income distribution.
Turvey's two problems are relevant to our study of smoking bans because they indi
cate the importance of understanding both benefits and costs for informed debate

regarding the merits of smoking bans. This study focuses on economic costs and
therefore adds to the understanding of how bans likely affect income distribution.
Significant reductions in the adult smoking population do not indicate that all
owners face customers with identical preferences regarding smoking. 4 Preferences
are likely to vary by income, age, marital status, occupation, and other factors. Some
owners cater to relatively many customers who smoke and others serve relatively
few. Some owners may have many customers who find non-smoking sections a viable
method of dealing with the smoking issue, and other owners may serve many custom
ers who prefer smoking to be forbidden.
Cost factors should also influence smoking policies chosen by owners. Some build
ings are relatively easy to modify for non-smoking use because ease of modification
may be affected by age, size, climate, and other factors. Larger spaces may be more
easily modified than smaller spaces and older spaces may be more difficult to modify
than newer spaces. Variations in smoking policies reflect the fact that individual own
ers allocate their resources to highest-valued uses. In our example, smoking policies
establish allocation of air space resources within businesses.
Coase [1960J provides the general framework for understanding how private
markets might deal efficiently with the allocation of air space in restaurants and bars
[Boyes and Marlow, 1996] An efficient solution requires that owners be allowed to
make all decisions regarding the use oftheir resources, which includes air space within
their establishments, and transactions costs must not be prohibitive. The first condi
tion is met when owners establish smoking policies within their establishments with
out interference from restrictive laws. Owners may forbid smoking, allow smoking
throughout, or provide a mix of smoking and non-smoking seating as they freely allo
cate air space to highest-valued customers.
Further discussion of transactions costs is in order. Transactions costs are likely
to be prohibitive if smoking policies were determined at the start of each business
day. For instance, smokers and non-smokers could bid against each other every day,
with the winner determining the extent to which smoking would be allowed. This
conceivably would result in a wide vmiety of smoking policies over time, but is an
unlikely event when customer bases (and their preferences regarding smoking) are
stable. That is, it is more cost-effective for owners to establish permanent smoking
policies as a means of lowering transactions costs as they cater to their customers.
While this practice is unlikely to establish a complete internalization of externali
ties, it should be remembered that neither the private sector nor the government is
likely to internalize externalities fully. A better question is: "Which one does a better
job?" Our study focuses on how the private sector meets customer preferences by
designing smoking policies that cater to various customer and business attributes.
The second condition then appears to be met because owners act as intermediar
ies between demanders of air space: smoking and nonsmoking customers. While trans
actions costs of agreement on smoking policies between these two sets of consumers
would be prohibitive if the consumers were to negotiate before each meal, negotia
tions actually take place in another manner. Owners have an incentive to effectively
deal with these divergent sets of demanders by offering differing smoking environ
ments. To do otherwise not only reduces their ability to meet customer preference

but also lowers profits. It is predictable that, just as some restaurants will serve
Mexican food while others feature steak, some owners will allocate all air space to
non-smoking uses, others will find it more effective to not prohibit smoking any
where, and still others will divide their seating place between smoking and non
smoking uses.
Owners may also invest in physical separations of smokers from non-smokers as
well as air filtration equipment as they cater to customer preferences within their
individual cost constraints. For instance, bar owners may find it cheaper to invest in
air filtration equipment than to designate non-smoking sections. These may be sub
stitute policies within the context of pleasing their customers. Restaurant owners
operating large spaces may find it cheaper to insert walls separating smoking and
non-smoking seating than owners with small spaces. The point is that policies will
vary because of variation in customer preferences and cost constraints and that such
variation is consistent with owners maximizing long-term values of their businesses
and meeting preferences of their customers.
Predictably, owners will offer more smoking options in markets dominated by
smokers than in markets dominated by non-smokers. As previously discussed, how
ever, other factors may influence allocations of seating into smoking/non-smoking
designations. These may include such variables as the size of investments in smok
ing patios and air filtration equipment, the size of the firm (particularly when scale
economies exist in catering to both smoking and non-smoking populations), whether
an establishment is a member of a corporate chain or an independent firm, the num
ber of years in business, and the age of buildings.
Coase [1960] argues that successful internalization of an externality doesn't de
pend upon who has the property right to a scarce resource, as long as it is vested upon
a private owner. In the case of the air space within restaurants, the property right is
owned by the restaurant owner, who then "sells" it to customers who value the re
source the most. Restaurant owners are intermediaries between the two sets of bid
del's, smokers and non-smokers, who then determine smoking policies on the basis of
who values the air space the most. Smoking policies will favor smokers when smokers
"bid" the highest for the resource, but favor non-smokers when they "bid" the high
est. "Bidding" takes the form of contribution to profits by customers. Customers who
contribute more toward profits "out-bid" customers who contribute less toward prof
its."
As discussed above, Coase [1960] establishes the importance of property rights
and low transactions costs in guiding an efficient allocation of resources within the
private market in cases of externalities. Turvey argues that, "when negotiation is
possible, the case for government intervention is one of justice not of economic effi
ciency" [1963, 313]. This conclusion suggests the importance of studying whether
the private market offers a viable mechanism for internalizing externalities associ
ated with smoking within restaurants and bars. 6
It is instructive to contrast incentives facing private owners and political au
thorities regarding decision-making over smoking policies. Profit-maximizing own
ers cater to a much narrower constituency, or base, than do political authorities.
Customer attitudes toward smoking are their clearest guide to optimal smoking poli
cies and it is predictable that owners will not offer one-size-fits-all policies when

customer attitudes are diverse. The bottom line for owners is maximizing the value
of their business, and therefore they focus on pleasing paying customers. Smoking
policies are then determined at the level of business and, because each owner faces a
unique set of customers, smoking policies will vary substantially among businesses.
Constituencies of political authorities are much broader than customer bases of
owners and include various special interest groups. These may include, for instance,
public health advocates who often favor bans, as well as business advocates such as
Chambers of Commerce who often oppose them. Individual voters are also constitu
ents, some of whom will frequent restaurants often and others who do not. The
signal flowing to political authorities therefore will be broader than that flowing to
owners. It would appear that, while owners set policies that please customers, smok
ing policies advocated by political authorities will be less related to maximizing the
value of individual businesses. Profits for individual owners are therefore likely to
suffer when political authorities set policies that are inconsistent with the smoking
preferences of customers.
There is widespread agreement that smoking generates negative externalities
that may include nuisance to non-smokers and adverse health consequences. An ap
propriate question, then, is to ask if actions of private owners to allocate resources
efficiently by catering to customer preferences regarding smoking are synonymous
with a socially efficient resource allocation. The answer is clearly complex and intro
duces several related issues. One, do customers correctly identity the true levels of
externalities?? Two, do customers convey smoking preferences to owners that are con
sistent with correct understanding of externalities? Three, do owners then cater to
these preferences of customers in the smoking policies they provide?
It should be understood that many of these same issues arise when we examine
how governments provide smoking policies. That is, do policymakers correctly iden
tify externalities and then design and enforce policies that internalize them? As
discussed above, Turvey [1963] discusses these issues when addressing whether gov
ernment or the private sector should attempt to internalize externalities.
The issue is not whether government or private owners can fully internalize
externalities, but which one is likely to be more successful given the various compli
cations. This study focuses on how well private owners internalize externalities by
empirically examining the extent to which customer preferences, as well as other
factors such as accommodation costs, enter into smoking policies chosen by owners.
The empirical work offers insights into how well the private sector meets the prefer
ences of customers regarding smoking.

DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY OF SURVEY DATA
The ETC Institute of Olathe, Kansas surveyed a total of 978 owners of restau
rants, bars and taverns in Wisconsin during February and March 2001. H The survey
data was used to determine general characteristics of restaurants and bars/taverns in
Wisconsin. Of those surveyed, 56 percent consisted of restaurant owners (550 owners)
and 44 percent consisted of bar and tavern owners (428 owners). This sample repre
sents precision of at least +/-3.3 percent at the 95 percent level of confidence.

TABLE 1

Statistics Related to Non-Smoking Seating Allocations
All Restaurants
percentage

with Restrictions
percentage

without Restrictions
percentage

Distribution Seating Allocated to Non-Smoking Use
0-25 percent Non-Smoking
42
16
26-50 percent Non-Smoking
13
51-75 percent Non-Smoking
28
76-100 percent Non-Smoking

15
21
17
47

47
18
15
19

Average Non- Smoking Seating

56

34

44

Smoking Allowed in Bar Area a
Separate Smoking Area
Smoking Section
Outdoor Areas
Separate Room
Separately Ventilated Room

34
31
29
16
14
4

a. Multiple responses were allowed.

Unlike previous nationwide studies, this survey provides an in-depth examina
tion of one state, and is the most detailed survey conducted to date and gathers
information on numerous factors that might influence smoking policies of owners.
For instance, detailed information on the class of occupations of typical customers
and whether businesses have liquor licenses provide much clearer examination of
factors that might underlie smoking policies. Previous studies of accommodation
policies lacked information on local smoking laws and instead focused on only state
smoking laws, thus neglecting the possibility that some locations within the same
state have much more stringent smoking laws than others. Focus on one state allows
examination of local smoking laws without complications that arise from the diver
sity of state policies.
According to the survey results there are four general types of restaurants in
Wisconsin:

•
•

•
•

restaurants serving all types of alcohol
restaurants serving no alcohol
fast food
restaurants serving beer and wine

(62 percent),
(20 percent),
(12 percent), and
( 7 percent).

Owners offer a diverse set of smoking policies. For example, 18 percent of restau
rants, but only 0.2 percent ofbars, provide smoke-free facilities. In other words, roughly
one-fifth of restaurants and virtually no bars ban smoking. An additional 45 percent
of restaurants, and 2 percent of bars, allow at least some smoking. Of these restau
rants, 31 percent of owners are constrained by law and another 28 percent are con
strained by corporate policy. Table 1 reports more detail on the various smoking policies.

TABLE 2
Summary Statistics of Key Variables Regarding Restaurants
Continuous Variables

Mean

NS: Percent of Non-Smoking Seating 44.4
SMOKERS: Percent of Customers
Who Smoke
36.1
CHILDREN: Percent of Customers
Who Bring Children
18.2
AGE: Years in Business
20.8
BUILDINGAGE: Age of Building
(years)
54.7
SEATS: Number of Seats
121.8

Median

Minimum

Maximum

50.0

0

100

30.0

0

99

15.0
14.0

0
9.5

90
99

50.0
90

1
0

Dichotomous Variables

230
1800
Percent

FASTFOOD:Percent of Operating Fast Food Restaurants
GENERAL: Percent of Businesses with General Liquor License
CHAIN: Percent of Businesses Affiliated with Chain
COLLEGETOWN:Percent of Businesses in College Town
WHITECOLLAR:Percent of Businesses Whose Typical Customer Holds White-Collar Job
BAN:Percent of Businesses Subject to Government Smoking Ban
RESTRICTION:Percent of Businesses Subject to Government Restriction (less than ban)

12
62
11
27
34
7
22

ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF NON-SMOKING SEATING IN
RESTAURANTS9
A basic regression model is used to predict that restaurant owners base non
smoking seating policies on the basis of four groups of factors. lO Bars are not in
cluded in estimations because they provide virtually no non-smoking seating. The
model is shown below in equation 1, where:

NS = percentage of seating allocated to non-smoking use,
Customer = demand-related factors,
Business = type of business factors,
Cost = size and cost factors, and
Law = smoking law factors.
(1)

NS

= f(Customer, Business, Cost, Law)

Table 2 displays summary statistics of all variables used in the empirical exami
nation. The first group of variables tested might be defined best as "Consumer Fac
tors" because they represent the demographic and social attributes of the dining pub
lic. As discussed earlier, restaurant owners are hypothesized to provide less non
smoking seating as shares of smoking customers (SMOKERS) rise because this fac
tor indicates preferences regarding smoking. Other authors including Lilley [1996]
show that smoking bans have little impact on restaurant employment in college

towns, therefore we hypothesize that restaurant owners in such locales
(COLLEGETOWN) will tend to provide more non-smoking seating as casual obser
vation suggests. We hypothesize that restaurant owners provide more non-smoking
seating when more patrons are white-collar workers (WHITECOLLAR) than blue
collar (BLUECOLLAR) based on the expectation that the incidence of smoking falls
with income. These job-related variables are defined as dummy variables whereby
they equal one if the owner states that either one is their "average" customer, and
equal to zero if otherwise. Finally, CHILDREN measures the percentage of adult
customers accompanied by children aged 18 or less. We hypothesize that non-smok
ing seating rises as the share of patrons bringing in children rises because this rep
resents a less social environment populated by fewer smokers.
The second group of variables tested can be defined as "Business Type Factors,"
as they represent underlying qualities ofthe restaurants themselves. Owners of fast
food restaurants (FASTFOOD) are expected to offer more non-smoking seating be
cause they face patrons who are generally in a hurry to eat and leave. FASTFOOD
equals one for fast food businesses and zero otherwise. Owners of restaurants with
general liquor licenses, offering beer, wine and hard liquor, (GENERAL) are ex
pected to offer less non-smoking seating because their patrons often linger during
meals and tend to be older and seek a more social environment than restaurants
that do not serve all types of alcohol. GENERAL equals one if the businesses has a
general liquor license and zero otherwise. Chain affiliation (CHAIN) is hypothesized
to raise non-smoking seating as smoking and non-smoking sections are often dic
tated by corporate ownership. CHAIN equals one if the business belongs to a corpo
rate chain and zero otherwise. Finally, the age of the establishment (AGE) is mea
sured in years and is expected to be inversely related to non-smoking seating based
on the expectation that older businesses have many longtime patrons that reflect
generations where smoking was more tolerated.
The third grouping of variables might best be described as "Size and Cost Fac
tors." These represent the physical attributes of the restaurants and, as discussed
earlier, can influence the cost of providing non-smoking space. Building age
(BUILDINGAGE) is measured in years and is expected to be negatively related to
non-smoking seating because older buildings are likely to be more costly to retrofit
when accommodating non-smokers with partitions, additions, and air filtration in
vestments. l1 SEATS measures number of seats and is hypothesized to be positively
related to non-smoking seating because larger numbers of seats makes separation of
smokers from non-smokers more likely. Moreover, larger seating may also allow own
ers to offer relatively larger non-smoking sections. 12
The last grouping of variables represents "Smoking Laws." Restaurant own
ers who are subject to smoking bans (BAN) are hypothesized to offer relatively more
non-smoking seating simply because the law dictates that they do so. BAN equals
one when local law provides a ban and zero otherwise. Similar logic suggests that
presence of a smoking restriction that is less than a ban (RESTRICTION) is associ
ated with more non-smoking seating. RESTRICTION equals one when restrictions
are present and zero otherwise.

TABLE 3
OLS Estimates of Non-Smoking Share of Seating
All Restaurants

without Restrictions

with Restrictions

Coefficient Ct-stat)
57.76
(9.77)

Coefficient (t-stat)
69.61
(6.68)

-0.76 a
(9.79)
6.63
(1.66)
16.85 a
(4.40)
0.27 a
(2.74)

-0.57 a
(3.41)
8.53
(1.45)
10.39
(1.79)
-0.11
(0.60)
20.61
(1.81)
-2.86
(0.42)

11.18 b
(2.38)

13.41
(1.85)
-12.83 a
(3.31)
13.31 b
(2.03)

-0.14 b
(2.22)

-0.22 a
(2.75)

0.04
(0.27)

-0.04
(0.33)

0.004
(0.09)

-0.10
(1.29)

0.04 a
(3.46)

0.06 a
(3.13)

0.02
(1.26)

0.41
29.63
33.96
24.99 a
344

0.23
26.43
58.85
4.25 a
111

Coefficient (t-stat)
62.23
02.65)
Customer Characteristics
SMOKERS
-O.73 a
(11.03)
COLLEGETOWN
6.84 b
(2.17)
WHITECOLLAR
14.59 a
(4.78)
CHILDREN
O.17 b
(2.06)
Business Type Factors
13.20 b
FASTFOOD
(2.49)
-12.41 a
GENERAL
(3.87)
Variable
Constant

CHAIN
AGE

11.14
(1.25)

Size and Cost Factors

BUILDINGAGE
SEATS
Smoking Ban Factors

BAN

30.52 a
(4.72)

RESTRICTION

10.04a
(3.03)
0.47
28.95
43.72
36.73 a
491

Adjusted R'
s.e.e.
Mean dependent val'.
F-Statistic
Observations

a. Denotes a .01 level of significance. b. Denotes a .05 level of significance.

Table 3 displays ordinary least squares regression estimations of non-smoking
seating shares for restaurants-that is, percentage of seating devoted to non-smok
ing use. Three estimations are displayed: all restaurants, restaurants without gov
ernment smoking restrictions, and restaurants with government smoking restric
tions (but less than a ban).13
Estimation using data on all restaurants indicates that all variables except for
the age of building are significant and of the expected sign. Smokers as a share of all

customers exert a negative effect, indicating that owners allocate less space to non
smoking as the share of smokers rises. The positive coefficient on the college town
dummy indicates that owners allocate relatively more space when businesses are
located in college towns. Owners whose typical customer holds a white-collar job also
allocate relatively more space to non-smoking use. Owners allocate relatively more
space to non-smoking use as more of their adult customers bring children with them.
Fast food restaurants allocate relatively more space toward non-smoking use than
other restaurants. Restaurants with general liquor licenses allocate less space to
ward non-smoking use. Restaurants that are affiliated with a corporate chain allo
cate relatively more space to non-smoking use. Age of business negatively affects non
smoking allocations and numbers of seats is positively related to non-smoking seat
ing allocations.
Finally, businesses that are subject to smoking bans or other government restric
tions allocate relatively more of their seating to non-smoking use. While Dunham and
Marlow [2000a] find that smoking laws do not affect seating allocations of owners,
their model estimates the relation between state smoking laws on seating allocations.
Their finding of no significant relationship is consistent with the hypothesis that states
with relatively few smokers are those that tend to pass smoking laws and therefore
their owners would offer more non-smoking seating in the absence oflaws. This study,
however, considers local, not state, laws and is not directly comparable to Dunham
and Marlow [2000a]. Since no data exist on the populations of smokers within local
jurisdictions it is not possible to control for the likelihood that local laws tend to be
passed in jurisdictions with relatively few smokers. This overturns some of the sig
nificance of the ban and restrictions variables.
Estimations using data on restaurants without restrictions mirror the results using
data on all restaurants and are not separately discussed. 14 Estimation of the model
using data on restaurants with government restrictions (but not bans), however, indi
cates a sharp drop in the number of factors that significantly influence the seating
allocations toward non-smoking use. Only one factor exerts significant impacts on
seating allocations: smokers as a share of customers (negative influence). It is not
surprising that the last estimation, which is based on restaurants with government
restrictions, reveals a sharp drop in the number offactors that significantly influence
owner decisions regarding seating allocations. This is not surprising since govern
ment restrictions provide one-size-fits-all requirements on owners regarding their
smoking decisions. As indicated in the other estimations, many factors underlie owner
decisions regarding accommodation in the private market. Government restrictions
overturn many of these factors, making them irrelevant to the final allocation of seat
ing.
Interestingly, decisions within the constraints of government restrictions remain
sensitive to smoking preferences. Specifically, the share of customers who smoke
continues to exert a significant and negative influence on seating allocations toward
non-smoking use. This result is consistent with the profit-maximization scenario:
owners who serve government-mandated minimum requirements for non-smoking
seating will provide just that minimum when they cater to relatively many smokers.
Alternatively, owners who face relatively few smokers may provide seating alloca
tions that exceed such minimums.

CONCLUSION
This study finds an active private market in accommodation of smokers and non
smokers in Wisconsin restaurants. Empirical analysis indicates that a large number
offactors underlie owner decisions regarding how to allocate seating to non-smoking
use. Owners not only base their decision on the number of smokers in their commu
nity, but also consider customer occupations, presence of children, and whether busi
nesses are located in college towns, as well as type of restaurant and whether the
establishment has a general liquor license. Business age, numbers of seats, and mem
bership in a corporate chain also underlie decisions made in the private market for
accommodation.
Government smoking restrictions that are less than bans overturn all of the fac
tors that owners previously found critical to their choices of accommodation policies,
except for the number of smokers in their client base.
These findings indicate that an active private market in accommodation is consis
tent with diversity of smoking policies. This study mirrors previous studies showing
that some owners find it profitable to ban all smoking, others to provide a mix of
smoking and non-smoking seating, and still others to allow smoking throughout their
establishments. Policy diversity is a natural consequence of differences in customer
and business factors.
Smoking bans prohibit diversity because owners cannot freely set policies on the
basis of customer and business factors. This study predicts that owners are likely to
suffer losses when government bans and restrictions significantly overturn smoking
policies chosen in the absence of government intervention. In addition, the analysis
indicates that government restrictions that are less stringent than bans leave some
room for diversity on the basis of the number of smokers in their client population.
Predictably, owners who undergo the largest changes in smoking policies will be
those who most often experience profit losses.
Finally, smoking bans may also impose losses on consumers as well as owners
when customers experience adverse changes following bans. Higher prices and lower
menu choice, food quality, and waiting staff service are a few of the many changes
that owners may establish as they attempt to shift costs of bans onto customers
[Dunham and Marlow, 2003J. Costs imposed on consumers should be included with
costs imposed on owners (lower profits) when we examine effects of bans on income
distribution.
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The correlation coefficient between AGE and BUILDINGAGE is .10, indicating that multicollinearity
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Number of employees was not included because it is highly correlated with numbers of seats.
We also ran specifications with and without SMOKERS as a precaution regarding possible
multicollinearity with the other variables such as WHITECOLLAR, GENERAL, BAN or RESTRIC
TION. The highest simple correlation coefficients were between SMOKERS and WHITECOLLAR
(2.32) and between SMOKERS and RESTRICTION (2.20). Dropping SMOKERS or WHITECOLLAR
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